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The EU–Turkey Migration Deal: Performance
and Prospects
Dogachan DAGI*
This article discusses whether the EU–Turkey migration deal of 2016 is sustainable in the midst
of divergent priorities and expectations of the parties, adverse results procured from the deal, and
growing mutual distrust between the EU and Turkey. In so doing, first, it provides an overview
on the background of Europe’s migration crisis of 2015–2016 and outlines the rationale behind
and expectations from the deal. Secondly, the article critically reviews the performance of the deal
to evaluate the extent to which it has met the expectations. It is explained that while Turkey has
gained strategic leverage in its relations with the EU its government has to bear political costs at
the home-front and shelve off its accession perspective. The EU, on the other hand, has managed
to reduce the number of migrants using the Eastern Mediterranean route but has to endure
constant threats of the Turkish government to withdraw from the deal and put up with its
withering reputation as a normative power. Finally, by highlighting the expectation-outcome gap
and the political cost the deal has induced to bear for both parties, this article demonstrates that
the agreement has been circumstantial without a solid foundation, and any of the parties may
opt-out once it regards the cost-benefit balance works unfavourably for them.
Keywords: Migration, European Union, the EU–Turkey Migration Deal, Normative Power,
Human Rights, Populism, European politics, Turkish Politics
1 INTRODUCTION
On 27 February 2020 Turkey declared it would no longer stop migrants trying to
cross its borders into Europe in reaction to the killing of its thirty-six soldiers in a
raid by the Russian-backed Syrian government forces in Idlib, north-west of Syria.
This was a long-waited move on the part of the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, who had repeatedly threatened the EU of ‘opening the gates’ for the
refugees. ‘If European countries are living in peace today, it is thanks to Turkey for
hosting four million refugees’, he said in May 2019 referring to the 2016 EU–
Turkey migration deal.1 Distressing words of the Turkish president who reminded
European policy makers of the leverage he held as the gatekeeper of refugees were
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1 Anadolu Agency, Europe in Peace Thanks to Turkey: Erdogan (3 May 2019), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/
europe/europe-in-peace-thanks-to-turkey-erdogan/1469285 (accessed 15 Dec. 2019).
not pointless. Over two million people mostly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq
illegally had crossed the EU borders during what known to be the 2015–2016
European refugee crisis using Turkey as the main route to enter.2 Facing such a
mass influx in a short space of time positioned the EU institutions and national
political systems as well as the public at large under unprecedented stress.3 The
situation the EU found itself in begged for swift and decisive measures to be taken
collectively. Yet, this proved to be highly problematic as the twenty-eight
Member States with diverging national priorities and political culture encountered
difficulties in agreeing upon a common response.4 Besides, neither the Member
States individually nor the EU as a whole had the capacity to quickly address the
root causes of mass migration in the top refugee exporting countries, for instance,
stopping the civil war in Syria, and stabilizing political and economic situation in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Hence, the EU appeared to have been left with a policy
option of externalizing migration controls; in other words, to make sure migrants
are contained in a safe third country before reaching the borders of the EU. In this
endeavour, despite the worsening bilateral relations due to the rising authoritar-
ianism and strong anti-European discourse of Erdogan, securing a deal with
Turkey was of utmost importance as it was the main route the migrants took to
enter Europe. The Turkish government, though annoyed by European criticisms
about its worsening democratic performance and human rights record, was also
willing to strike a deal with the EU to transform the mode of relationship with its
old partner. A deal was eventually reached on 18 March 2016 that has enabled
Turkey’s president to send repeated messages since then that the EU’s migration
policy, if not its peace and security, depends on his goodwill.
Is such a model of externalizing EU’s migration policy through a deal with
Turkey sustainable given the mixed results of the deal, increasing mutual distrust
and counter accusations among the parties, and their unmet expectations? This
article reassesses the EU–Turkey migration deal, its rationale and performance in a
way to explain the ground on which the 2016 agreement is built. It argues that
given the rationale and justifications of the deal, the overall outcome does not fully
satisfy both sides. While Turkey has gained strategic leverage in its relations with
the EU it has to bear political costs at the home front and shelve off its accession
perspective. Besides, it keeps asking for more financial contribution from its
European partner to upheld the deal as the number of refugees continues to
2 Eurostat, Third Country National Found to Be Illegally Present-Annual Data (23 Aug. 2019), http://
appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eipre&lang=en (accessed 15 Dec. 2019).
3 E. Harteveld, J. Schaper & S. De Lange, Blaming Brussels? The Impact of (News About) the Refugee Crisis
on Attitudes Towards the EU and National Politics, 56(1) J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 157–177 (2018).
4 A. Niemann & N. Zaun, EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: Theoretical and Empirical
Perspectives, 56(1) J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 3–32 (2018).
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increase in Turkey. On the other hand, having managed to reduce the number of
migrants using the Eastern Mediterranean route the EU has to endure constant
threats of the Turkish government to withdraw from the deal, and put up with its
withering reputation as a normative power. Moreover, international civil society
has remained highly critical of the deal which was seen as a breach of the right for
asylum. Can an agreement like the EU–Turkey migration deal survive such a
severe policy environment? This article, by pointing to the expectation-outcome
gap and lack of satisfaction on both sides, argues that the EU–Turkey migration
deal continues to stand on shaky ground, is a crisis-ridden one in nature, and as
such, it has been circumstantial without a solid foundation that is unlikely to last
long. To explain this, first, this article provides a brief overview on the background
of Europe’s migration crisis of 2015–2016 and outlines the rationale and objectives
of the EU–Turkey agreement. Secondly, the article critically reviews the perfor-
mance of the deal to evaluate the extent to which it has met the expectations.
Doing so it assesses the migration numbers on the east Mediterranean route since
the deal signed, the damage it inflicted on the EU’s normative power, and the state
of populist movements in Europe that use migration as an issue of mobilization.
Finally, the article evaluates Turkey’s strategic gains vis-à-vis its dealings with the
EU as well as the political cost the migration deal with the EU incurred on Turkish
government.
2 EUROPE’S MIGRATION CRISIS OF 2015–2016
In general terms, civil wars, humanitarian crisis, excessive poverty, and general
lawlessness in the Middle Eastern and African countries constituted the root cause
of the 2015–2016 migration crisis of Europe. Within this general context, some
specific circumstances in the summer of 2015 triggered this new wave of migration
into Europe. First of all, the Assad regime had made it easier for Syrian nationals,
who constituted the largest source of irregular migration to Europe, to leave the
country in order to further cleanse Syria from its opponents.5 Secondly, Turkey
already hosting about three million refugees and being the main route of migrants
to the EU turned a blind eye, under the initiative of President Erdogan, to mostly
Syrian migrants who crossed the Turkish border illegally.6 Thirdly, the govern-
ment of Macedonia declared that they had changed their regulations on illegal
immigration, making it possible for migrants to head towards the West via trains
5 Syria Changes Passport Rules for Citizens Abroad, Daily Mail (28 Apr. 2015), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/
wires/afp/article-3056388/Syria-changes-passport-rules-citizens-abroad.html (accessed 17 Dec. 2019).
6 Gateway to Europe:WhyTurkey Isn’t Stopping theMigrants, Euronews (22 Sept. 2015), https://www.euronews.
com/2015/09/22/gateway-to-europe-why-turkey-isn-t-stopping-the-migrants (accessed 17 Dec. 2019).
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and busses.7 Lastly, the speeches of ruling European elites, in particular, German
and Swedish politicians who announced ‘solidarity’ with the refugees fleeing war
referring to their ‘welcome culture’ boosted the motivation of the Middle Eastern
and African migrants to head towards Europe.8
As a result, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in 2015 alone over one million migrants reached Europe by sea mainly
landing on Greece and Italy while almost 4,000 of them were believed to drown
trying to cross the Mediterranean. Among them, over 800,000 migrants came via the
Aegean Sea from Turkey into Greece in 2015, exceeding its capacity to cope with
such a high number of asylum seekers.9 The flow of migrants into Europe continued
unabated in 2016. With the EU´s failure to come up with a common response to the
migration crisis the Dublin regulation and the Schengen visa regime governing
migration and the free movement of people were the first institutions to be in
grave danger. In a bid to protect themselves from being overwhelmed by mass
migration the Member States took a variety of abrupt precautions from the con-
struction of security barriers in the Hungarian-Serbian border10 to the temporary
suspension of Schengen visa policy by Austria11 and France.12 In response, Angela
Merkel, the chancellor of Germany warned the Europeans that Schengen could be
nullified if all the Member States refuse to take their ‘fair share’ of refugees.13 Also, it
appeared that the Dublin regulation caused enormous dilemmas for the EU institu-
tions as well as its members. The secondary movements of the refugees from their
country of entry violated the Dublin regulations as it eliminated border controls
within the EU, but it also exposed the Member States in the Mediterranean which
are the gates of entry for the refugees.
This created serious anxiety for the EU as the decades-long European inte-
gration were effectively regressing due to great external pressures. However, the
problem was much deeper than the malfunctioning of the Schengen regime and
the Dublin regulation. The mass influx of Middle Eastern and African migrants to
7 Macedonia Allows Migrants to Legitimately Transit Country, VoA News (18 June 2015), https://www.
voanews.com/a/macedonia-migrants-asylum-law/2828577.html (accessed 16 Dec. 2019).
8 F. Trauner & J. Turton, Welcome Culture: The Emergence and Transformation of a Public Debate on
Migration, 46(1) OZB: Austrian J. Pol. Sci. 33–42 (2017).
9 UNHCR, Over One Million Sea Arrivals Reach Europe in 2015 (30 Dec. 2015), https://www.unhcr.org/
news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html (accessed 16 Dec. 2019).
10 Website of the Hungarian Government, Reinforcement of Temporary Border Barrier Starts on the Hungarian–
Serbian Border (4 Apr. 2016), http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/reinforcement-of-
temporary-security-barrier-starts-on-the-hungarian-serbian-border (accessed 16 Dec. 2019).
11 J. Minns & M. Karnitschnig, Austria Suspends Schengen, Politico (17 Jan. 2016), http://www.politico.
eu/article/austria-suspends-schengen-border-checks-eu-migrants/ (accessed 20 Dec. 2019).
12 France Suspends Schengen Visa, Schengenvisainfo (13 Nov. 2015), https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/
news/france-suspends-schengen-visa/.
13 M. Karnitschnig,Merkel Warns Schengen Could Be at Risk, Politico (31 Aug. 2015), http://www.politico.eu/
article/merkel-warns-schengen-at-risk-germany-refugees-migration-quotas-travel/ (accessed 20Dec. 2019).
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Europe posed serious demographic, economic, and political challenges. The
European public at large was highly sceptical of the way the EU dealt with the
crisis14 as the media presented the cases of cultural conflict in terms of the rise of
terrorism, petty crimes, and gang violence, which were associated with the recent
migration flows. The overwhelmingly Islamic nature of the migrants, as well as the
radically different cultural background of them in comparison with Western values
and European lifestyle also raised concerns among the European public about the
possibility of coexistence.15 In such a context, once marginal populist parties with
strong anti-migration political agenda gained ground throughout Europe, further
jeopardizing stability and sustainability of the EU.16 It appeared that the events of
2015–2016 created serious unconstructive contestations in all levels of EU govern-
ance as strict lines were drawn between those who regarded the issue as firstly a
crisis of national security and sovereignty, and those who saw it as primarily a
matter of human security.17
In sum, the migration crisis of 2015–2016 shook the very foundations of the
EU’s migration policy, triggering complex questions with no apparent answers,
and defunctioning the institutions and regulations. The EU policy makers were
caught in between the desire to upheld what they believed to be ‘European values’
such as the welcome culture, anti-discrimination, right to asylum and the question
of how to respond to growing frustration of the public regarding the EU´s open
doors policy which created immense divisions between and within Member
States.18 Against this background that the EU Migration Commissioner described
the state of the union as follows: ‘The future of Europe is at stake if we do not
manage to provide permanent solutions on the migration issue’.19 Thus, under
tremendous stress, the EU wanted to find a solution for the problem by keeping
the migrants in third countries before they reach its borders. For this, it was
apparent that the EU had to persuade Turkey, despite the defiance of Erdogan
14 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer Survey: Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Security (2015), https://ec.
europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/20150408_1_
memo_eurobarometer_april_2015_v2_en.pdf; Migration Watch UK, Recent Polls on Immigration (7 Apr.
2016), https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/361 (accessed 21 Dec. 2019).
15 S. Wagstyl, Angela Merkel’s Warm Migrant Rhetoric Belies a Colder Welcome, Financial Times (12 May 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/cb85b500-179f-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e (accessed 22 Dec. 2019).
16 W. Galston, The Rise of European Populism and the Collapse of the Center-Left (Brookings Institution
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/08/the-rise-of-european-popu
lism-and-the-collapse-of-the-center-left/ (accessed 21 Dec. 2019).
17 D. Dagi, Refugee Crisis in Europe (2015–2016): The Clash of Intergovernmental and Supranational
Perspectives, 6(1) Int’l. J. of Soc. Sci. 1–8 (2017).
18 European Commission, A European Agenda on Migration (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/backgroundinformation/
docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf (accessed 23 Dec. 2019).
19 Avramopoulos: EU/Turkey Migrants Deal Must Survive, Euronews (12 Sept. 2019), https://www.euronews.
com/2019/09/11/avramapolous-eu-turkey-migrants-deal-must-survive (accessed 18 Dec. 2019).
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and increasingly poor human rights performance of Turkey, to close its borders
and act as a gatekeeper of Europe.
3 THE EU–TURKEY MIGRATION DEAL: THE CONTENT AND THE
CONTEXT
The EU found itself in a situation where not only it had been flooded with more
than one and a half million migrants, the overwhelming majority of them using
Turkey as a transit country, but also there were close to three million Syrian
refugees left in Turkey who were likely to take the route to Europe. Under such
great pressure, the EU sought a deal with Turkey to halt the mass migration
heading towards Europe and decrease the pressure put onto the EU institutions,
politicians and the European public opinion.20
During the height of the crisis, the EU and Turkey had already begun
negotiating for a deal on migration reaching an agreement on an action plan in
October 2015.21 The influx of migrants into Europe showed no sign of decline
even after the action plan since the Turkish government was not keen on counter-
ing human smugglers or illegal migrants without securing a tangible deal with the
EU that included financial and political concessions.22 The ineffective accord of
October 2015 was significantly reinforced with an agreement on 18 March 2016
known as the ‘EU–Turkey migration deal’. It created a joint coordination
mechanism to oversee the agreement and work to stop the flow of migrants
towards the EU.23 According to the deal, a ‘1:1 resettlement scheme’ was estab-
lished which meant that new illegal migrants entering the EU territory would be
deported to Turkey with the promise of the EU to relocate one Syrian refugee in
Turkey for every one sent back. Turkey also pledged to take all necessary measures
to guard its sea and land borders to prevent illegal migration into the EU
territories. Moreover, the deal included visa liberalization for Turkish nationals
immediately effective after Turkey`s fulfilment of the remaining seven technical
requirements out of a total of seventy-two. As part of the deal, the EU also agreed
to transfer to Turkey a humanitarian aid of EUR 6 billion for the facility for
refugees until the end of 2019. A general commitment to deepen the bilateral
relations, re-energize the accession process, and opening new negotiation chapters
in accession talks were also promised on the part of the EU.
20 Niemann & Zaun, supra n. 3, at 3.
21 European Commission, EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan, Press Release (Brussels 15 Oct. 2015), https://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm (accessed 22 Dec. 2019).
22 B. Saatcioglu, The European Union’s Refugee Crisis and Rising Functionalism in EU–Turkey Relations,
Turkish Stud. (2019), DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2019.1586542.
23 European Council, EU–Turkey Statement, Press Release (18 Mar. 2016), https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ (accessed 23 Dec. 2019).
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The deal came out of the belief on the European side that working together
with Turkey, despite the authoritarian turn under Erdogan’s leadership, is a
requisite to halt migration flow.24 The EU seemed to extend a helping hand
towards a country overwhelmed by refugees in terms of financial aid in return
for keeping the migrants in its own territory. Yet, in a bid to address growing
migration crisis with a humanitarian face, the EU was anxious to offer a variety of
moral reasons to justify an agreement with Turkey as framed by the Council of
European Union: ‘In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to
offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk, the EU and Turkey today
decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to EU’.25 Despite moral
dilemmas, the EU was first and foremost moved by an obvious concern, which
was to stop the flow of irregular migrants in order to mitigate its detrimental effects
on its institutions and Member States.26 It particularly aimed to halt ‘irregular
migration’ into Greece from Turkey by persuading the latter to seal off its borders
to migrants.
Moreover, another key rationale for European political leaders in signing a
deal with Turkey was to evade possible repercussions of the continued flow of
refugees in the context of rapidly rising ultra-right political movements which,
partly, resulted from the reaction to mass Islamic migration and concerns of
terrorism associated with migrants as exemplified by a terror attack at the office
of Charlie Hebdo in Paris in 2015.27 Against such a background already develop-
ing, the EU and member countries, struck hard by the new wave of migration,
appeared ‘desperately needing Turkey to serve as a migrant waiting room on its
borders’28 to ensure political stability by removing one of the breeding grounds of
rising Euroscepticism in the EU area.
Turkey, as an accession candidate, on the other hand, was in a position as a
transit country of refugee flows to bargain concessions in return for sealing off its
borders and accepting the returned refugees. From a Turkish point of view, the
migration negotiations came when a crisis was unfolding with Russia over the
downing of a Russian SU-24 attack aircraft, by Turkish air forces, which was
operating in a region controlled by the Turkish backed Islamist rebels in northern
24 European Commission, EU–Turkey Cooperation: A 3-Billion-Euro Refugee Facility for Turkey, Press Release
(24 Nov. 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6162_en.htm (accessed 22 Dec. 2019).
25 European Council, supra n. 23.
26 Saatcioglu, supra n. 22.
27 E. Collett, The Paradox of the EU–Turkey Refugee Deal, Migration Pol’y Inst. (2016), https://www.migra
tionpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal (accessed 24 Dec. 2019); J. F. Rodriguez, Paris, Berlin,
Ankara: ADeal Driven by Populism, Institute of EuropeanDemocrats (Brussels 2016), https://www.iedonline.
eu/download/2016/schengen/FERRO-RODRIGUEZ.pdf (accessed 24 Dec. 2019).
28 M. Wilczek, When the EU Is No Longer Able to Bribe Turkey, the Blackmail Will Begin, The Spectator (4
Mar. 2016), https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/03/when-the-eu-is-no-longer-able-to-bribe-turkey-
the-blackmail-will-begin/ (accessed 27 Dec. 2019).
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Syria. The Turkish government, after a period of worsening bilateral relations with
the Western world in general and the EU in particular, was looking for a
rapprochement with the West to avoid further isolation in the world. Besides,
the migration issue appeared as an opportunity to redefine its relations with the EU
on a strategic ground away from the human rights/rule of law/democracy agenda
on which the government had been receiving severe criticism in recent years from
the European circles.29
There was also a financial aspect of the deal for Turkey. Already having spent
more than EUR 7,6 billion on Syrian refugees,30 Turkey was in need of foreign aid
which the EU stipulated to provide. While the Turkish officials had been far from
complaining about the financial costs of the Syrian refugees in a show of strength
domestically, they nevertheless acknowledged that economic aid was needed, often
accusing the Western world of turning a blind eye to a humanitarian catastrophe and
leaving Turkey alone in dealing with Syrian refugees.31 The financial aid package
envisioned by the deal, therefore, warmly welcomed. Moreover, visa liberalization
promised by the EU, a long sought-after objective of Turkish governments, if
realized, would be as a major political victory in domestic politics.
Even though the bilateral relations were highly strained before the start of
negotiations, both sides, by March 2016, were prepared to put their disagreements
aside seeing each other as strategic allies willing to cooperate on ‘issues of mutual
concern’.32 The deal, thus, was expected to base bilateral affairs on a solid ground
of strategic cooperation to create a sustainable partnership instead of an ever-
slowing process of accession negotiations.
4 ASSESSING THE DEAL: A SUCCESS?
4.1 MIGRATION NUMBERS AFTER THE DEAL
The success of the deal cannot only be judged in terms of numbers but, immediately
after the agreement the first result of the deal was apparent: a significant decrease in the
number of migrants crossing the Aegean Sea as well as the number of migrants losing
29 European Commission, Turkey 2015 Report, Brussels, SWD, 216 Final (11 Oct. 2015); N. E. G. Aras,
Coercive Engineered Syrian Mass Migration in the EU–Turkey Relations: A Case Analysis for Future Reference,
57(2) Int’l Migration 186–199 (2019).
30 Turkey Spent $7.6 Billion Hosting 2.2 Million Syrian Refugees (Reuters 18 Sept. 2015), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-mideast-migrants-turkey/turkey-spent-7-6-billion-hosting-2-2-million-syrian-
refugees-idUSKCN0RI0N720150918 (accessed 27 Dec. 2019).
31 M. Ekinci, Turkiye-AB geri kabul anlaşması ve vize diyaloğu, SETA Analiz (2016).
32 European Commission, Implementing the EU–Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers (8 Dec. 2016),
https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2017-09/MEMO-16-4321_EN_0.pdf (accessed 27
Dec. 2019); I. Demirsu & D. Cihangir-Tetik, Constructing the Partnership with Turkey on the Refugee
Crisis: EU Perceptions and Expectations, 21(6) J. Balkan & Near E. Stud. 625–642 (2018).
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their lives. According to the report of the European Commission, in a matter of five
months after the deal, the irregular migration to Greece decreased a staggering 97%
and the death toll was almost eradicated by May 2016 falling from 270 witnessed in
January 2016.33 The deal seemed to have produced the expected result in 2017 too as
UNHCR data shows that illegal crossings from Turkey to Greece amounted to be less
than 6,000.34 However, in 2018 it is reported that the Turkish officials failed to stop
more than 30,000 illegal migrants on their way to Greece, a significant rise comparing
to 2017.35 According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) figures, a
total of 66,166 migrants arrived in Greece in 2019 more than doubled the previous
year, and the highest in the post-deal period.36
However, deportations from Greece to Turkey have remained significantly
lower than expected. According to the Commission, under the agreement, 2,130
migrants were returned between March 2016 and January 201837 while the
Turkish government maintained that only 1884 people have been sent back to
Turkey, including 357 Syrians38 which has been heavily criticized by the German
government for underperforming on deportations.39 Yet, as a response to the
increasing numbers of illegal arrivals to the Greek islands in the summer of 2019
Greece pledged to resume deportations to Turkey.40 The problems in migrant
33 European Commission, EU–Turkey Statement: Two Years on (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180314_eu-turkey-two-years-
on_en.pdf (accessed 3 Jan. 2020); L. B. Adam, The EU–Turkey Deal One Year On: A Delicate Balancing Act,
52(4) Int’l Spectator 44–58 (2017); M. Walter-Franke, Two Years Into the EU–Turkey ‘Deal’: Impact and
Challenges of a Turbulent Partnership, Jacques Delors Institut, Blog Post (15 Mar. 2018), https://www.
delorsinstitut.de/2015/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/20180315_Two-years-into-the-EU-Turkey-Deal_
Walter-Franke.pdf (accessed 3 Jan. 2020); E. Burnhill, EU–Turkey Deal: What Has Its Impact Been?, RTE
News (20 Mar. 2019), https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2019/0320/1037570-eu-turkey-deal/ (accessed 3
Jan. 2020); C. Marciliy & A. Garde, The EU–Turkey Agreement and Its Implications: An Unavoidable But
Conditional Agreement, Robert Schuman Foundation Policy Paper, no. 396 (14 June 2016).
34 Daily Sabah, UNHCR: Refugee and Migrant Numbers Spike in Greece (5 Sept. 2018), https://www.dailysabah.
com/world/2018/10/05/unhcr-refugee-and-migrant-numbers-spike-in-greece (accessed 5 Jan. 2020).
35 IOM, Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 103, 347 in 2018; Deaths Reach 2054 (16 Nov. 2018),
https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-103347-2018-deaths-reach-2054
(accessed 4 Jan. 2020).
36 M. Bierbach, Migration to Europe in 2019: Facts and Figures, Infomigrants (30 Dec. 2019), https://www.
infomigrants.net/en/post/21811/migration-to-europe-in-2019-facts-and-figures (accessed 4 Jan. 2020).
37 European Commission, Operational Implementation of the EU–Turkey Statement (12 Mar. 2019), https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/
press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_eu-turkey_en.pdf (accessed 6 Jan. 2020).
38 Turkey Suspends Deal with the EU on Migrant Readmission, Euractiv (24 July 2019), https://www.
euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/turkey-suspends-deal-with-the-eu-on-migrant-readmis
sion/ (accessed 6 Jan. 2020).
39 EU–Turkey Migrant Deal ‘Not Working Properly’: Germany’s Merkel (Reuters 11 Jan. 2019), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-germany-merkel-refugees/eu-turkey-migrant-deal-not-working-
properly-germanys-merkel-idUSKCN1P51VX (accessed 7 Jan. 2020).
40 H. Skopis, Greece Will Resume Deportation of Migrants to Turkey, Greek Reporter (24 Aug. 2019),
https://greece.greekreporter.com/2019/08/24/greece-will-resume-deportation-of-migrants-to-tur
key/ (accessed 8 Jan. 2020).
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deportations also undermined the implementation as well as the rationale of the
‘1:1 scheme’ which meant the resettlement of a Syrian refugee in Turkey to an EU
member for each migrant deported to Turkey. The EU Member States eventually
took many more Syrians than the migrants who have been sent back to Turkey.
Nevertheless, the deal actually projected at least 25,000 resettlements for the year
2017 alone, but no more than 12,000 Syrian refugees were resettled from Turkey
to the EU countries as of January 2018.41
4.2 EU’S REPUTATION AS A NORMATIVE POWER
The numbers indicate that the deal has saved many lives, of those who would have
otherwise been encouraged to cross the Aegean Sea at their own risk. However,
critics of the deal still maintain that the deal has actually jeopardized the safety of the
migrants as it pushed people who desperately want to reach Europe towards more
dangerous routes.42 Human rights groups insist that as a direct result of the migration
deal, the camps located in the Greek islands offer inhumane conditions of living and
are increasingly overcrowded. For instance, more than 4,000 people are stuck in a
migrant camp which has a capacity of 648 located in the Samos island.43 On the eve
of the third anniversary of the EU–Turkey accord, twenty-five human rights
organizations signed an open letter calling on European leaders ‘to take immediate
and sustained action to end the unfair and unnecessary containment policy’.44
It is evident that the EU–Turkey migration deal has created a moral dilemma
for the EU which appeared seeking ways to keep migrants out of their borders
disregarding the right to asylum.45 Critical voices, especially from human rights
groups, suggest that the EU did not fulfil its humanitarian responsibilities and
‘fortress Europe’ is not a moral answer to the migration challenge.46 It is also
41 European Commission, supra n.33.
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argued that the European governments that ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention
and its 1967 protocol are effectively shirking their international commitment to
refugee protection.47 Overall, the EU’s response to the migration wave of 2015–
2016 appeared prioritizing security over human rights, contrary to the claim that
the EU’s strategic interest must be consistent with its values. Such a position has
damaged the EU’s role as a normative power in world politics, and rendered
diffusing its values and norms problematical in the face of accusations that the deal
contravened the EU’s own values and norms.48
The EU’s normative standing has also come under criticism due to its acceptance
of Turkey as a safe third country for returning refugees.49 International human rights
NGOs including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have declared
Turkey not a safe place for refugees50 by pointing to the difficulties of the Syrian
refugees getting a work permit, the exploitation of Syrians in underpaid jobs and the
inaccessibility of education for Syrian children in Turkey.51 It is also suggested that
mounting evidence of human rights violations, sporadically occurring terrorist attacks
and the crackdown on free press can be cited as reasons why Turkey is not a safe third
country.52 The geographical limitation Turkey had inserted to the 1951 Refugee
Convention that guarantees refugee status only to European nationals under which the
Syrian refugees are not recognized as such but classified merely as ‘guests’ is also
reminded in the discussion of Turkey’s ‘safe country status’. The opponents maintain
that Turkey does not have a good record of refugee protection, and not being part of
the EU, the procedural safeguards that are in place within the EU are not applicable to
Turkey, so in cases of human rights violations or torture committed in Turkey, the
EU will violate the principle of non-refoulment.53 With all these criticism, not only
Turkey but also the EU has become the target of human rights criticism that has to a
47 K. Rygiel, F. Baban & S. Ilcan, The Syrian Refugee crisis: The EU–Turkey `Deal` and Temporary
Protection, 16(3) Global Soc. Pol’y 315–316 (2016).
48 Haferlach & Kurban, supra n.45; A. Bilgic & M. Pace, The European Union and Refugees. A Struggle Over
the Fate of Europe, 3(1) Global Aff. 89–97 (2017).
49 M. Gkliati, The EU–Turkey Deal and the Safe Third Country Concept Before the Greek Asylum Appeals
Committees, 3(3) Movements 215–223 (2017); D. Simsek, Turkey as a ‘Safe Third Country’? The Impacts of
the EU–Turkey Statement on Syrian Refugees in Turkey, 22(4) Perceptions 161–182 (2017); E. Roman, T.
Baird & T. Radcliffe,Why Turkey Is Not a ‘Safe Country’, Statewatch Analysis 1–26 (Feb. 2016), https://
www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-283-why-turkey-is-not-a-safe-country.pdf (accessed 9 Jan. 2020).
50 Amnesty International, Turkey: Illegal Mass Returns of Syrian Refugees Expose Fatal Flows in EU–Turkey
Deal (1 Apr. 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/turkey-illegal-mass-
returns-of-syrian-refugees-expose-fatal-flaws-in-eu-turkey-deal/ (accessed 10 Jan. 2020); B. Frelick,
Is Turkey Safe for Refugees?, Hum. Rts. Watch (22 Mar. 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/
22/turkey-safe-refugees (accessed 10 Jan. 2020).
51 L. B. Adam, The Refugee Card in EU–Turkey Relations: A Necessary But Uncertain Deal, Global Turkey
in Europe Working Paper 14 (2016).
52 K. Greenhill, Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European
Migration Crisis, 22(3) Eur. L. J. 328 (2016).
53 J. Poon, EU–Turkey Deal: Violation of, or Consistency with International Law, 1(3) Eur. Papers 1195–1196
(2016).
EU–TURKEY MIGRATION DEAL 207
certain extent damaged the latter’s standing as a normative power. It seemed that the
EU’s perceived security interests outweighing its ideals have undermined its moral
claim in world politics.54
4.3 THE STATE OF POPULISM
The EU’s attempt to stop the flow of migrants in 2016 through a deal with Turkey
was motivated, among others, by a concern that ever-increasing numbers of
migrants crossing into Europe were a breeding ground for populist political move-
ments. Their electoral breakthroughs, in fact, had predated the massive migration
flow of 2015–2016 but by 2016 about one-third of European voters started to vote
for populist parties across Europe spurred by the refugee crisis.55 Immigration
seems to have raised cultural and security concerns taken up by populist parties
across Europe. Slowing down the migration flow to Europe by a deal with Turkey
was expected to help render populist parties irrelevant, and thus, evade possible
political repercussions of the continued flow of migrants.56
In the end, the deal with Turkey may have slowed down the growth of the
anti-establishment populist parties that they had enjoyed during the refugee crisis
of 2015–2016. Nevertheless, they maintained a certain level of appeal, but could
not advance their 2016 position as feared by pro-EU circles. Despite the migration
deal, the national and European elections reveal that populist parties are here to
stay for some time. In Central and Eastern EU countries, political parties sceptical
towards mass migration and Islamization are overwhelmingly the most popular. In
the Western core EU countries, the ‘centre-left’ is rapidly collapsing57 though
populist parties are still short of winning solid majorities in the national elections.
This trend has been also demonstrated in the 2019 European Parliament elections
in which parties conventionally regarded to be ‘anti-establishment’ secured a third
of the total votes, nullifying the possibility of a centre-left and centre-right coali-
tion for the first time in the EU history.58 The migration question, three years after
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the European refugee crisis, still make up the fifth biggest issue influencing voting
decisions of one-third of Europeans according to recent polls.59 It can be assumed
that if it wasn’t for the EU–Turkey deal the issue of migration would have evolved
to be ever more salient, probably, resulting in a much higher share of votes for the
populists in European elections, and as such the deal by denying further ammuni-
tion to the populists might be considered to be a marginal success for the EU.
4.4 EU–TURKEY BILATERAL RELATIONS
From a Turkish perspective, the deal has not brought about its promises on
bilateral relations. The stated objective of re-energizing the EU–Turkey accession
talks has not been materialized, not a single new chapter has been opened in the
accession negotiations in the post-deal era. Moreover, the European Parliament,
pointing to ‘severe political and democratic backsliding’, overwhelmingly voted in
favour of suspending the accession talks with Turkey.60
The promise on visa liberation for Turkish citizens has not been realized too. This
was not solely due to the unwillingness of the EU officials but also because of Turkey`s
refusal to conform to the EU safety and travel regulations as well as the issues of
fighting against corruption and narrowing the scope of anti-terror legislation.61
Concerning the financial aid promised to Turkey, though there were techni-
cal disputes on the payment of 6 billion Euro from the EU to Turkey such as the
timing of the payment and EU`s requests for transparency to make sure the money
goes directly to Syrian refugees, the deal functioned relatively smoothly but with
some delay.62 The EU funds of EUR 3 billion for 2016–2017 were disbursed
while of the remaining EUR 3 billion for 2018–2019 almost all have been
committed, half of it have been contracted, and nearly one third disbursed. The
Turkish government frequently raised its dissatisfaction with the amount and the
way it was allocated. Nevertheless, even the EUR 6 billion committed from EU
taxpayers’ money was of little help for Turkey who according to official numbers
has spent about 40 billion USD for Syrian refugees63 in the midst of record-high
levels of unemployment and an economy in recession.
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4.5 GATEKEEPER TURKEY: STRATEGIC GAINS
The deal came as a reputational boost for Turkey in the middle of ever-
growing European criticism about its human rights situation and the govern-
ment’s authoritarian turn. Rallying behind an anti-Western popular sentiment
the government presented the deal as a strategic gain in which the power
relationship between Turkey and the EU has finally been balanced, even tilted
in favour of Turkey.64
The migration deal has certainly transformed the nature of the EU–
Turkey relations, turning it into a strategic partnership putting aside accession
perspective in practice, contrary to the claim to re-energize it in the agree-
ment. What appears to have mattered, for both sides, is to be able to work
together on the ‘issues of mutual concern’. The Turkish government, no
longer contemplating the possibility of the EU membership, by laying the
ground for a strategic partnership, has earned a significant leverage over the
EU.65 Awareness about the changing strategic balance between the EU and
Turkey is evident on the part of the Turkish leadership in the leaked account
of a meeting between Erdogan and high-level EU officials as the former is
quoted saying: ‘We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and
we can put the refugees on buses (…) So how will you deal with refugees if
you don’t get a deal? Kill the refugees?’.66
Erdogan repeatedly used the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey as a
leverage against the EU in general and Germany in particular, threatening to
‘open the gates’ to Europe and flood the EU countries with migrants.67 He
acclaimed several times that European countries should be grateful to Turkey
for hosting four million refugees.68 Asking for support for his policy of setting
up a safe zone in northern Syria, Erdogan warned: ‘Either you will provide
support, or excuse us, but we are not going to carry this weight alone. We
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65 G. Seufert, Refugee Crisis: For Rationality in Relations with Turkey, SWP (Berlin 11 Mar. 2016), https://
www.swp-berlin.org/en/point-of-view/refugee-crisis-for-rationality-in-relations-with-turkey/
(accessed 17 Jan. 2020); N. E. G. Aras, A Game Changer in EU–Turkey Relations: The Opportunities and
Pitfalls of Migration Policy, 54(4) Int’l Spectator 55 (2019).
66 Turkey’s Erdogan Threatened to Flood Europe with Migrants: Greek Website (Reuters 8 Feb. 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-eu-turkey-idUSKCN0VH1R0 (accessed 18
Jan. 2020).
67 Erdoğan’dan AB’ye: Daha ileri giderseniz, sınır kapıları açılır, BBC Türkçe (25 Nov. 2016), https://www.
bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-38103319 (accessed 18 Jan. 2020).
68 Anadolu Agency, supra n. 1.
210 EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
have not been able to get help from the international community, namely the
European Union’.69
Trapped in the new strategic relationship instead of the accession perspective of
conditionality the EU found its hands tied to influence the Turkish government on
the issues of human rights violations, de-Europeanization, increasing authoritarian-
ism, freedom of the press, etc. Some even argued that with the migration deal
Turkey reversed the conditionality principle in its relations with the EU.70 Turkey’s
strategic upper-hand, after the deal, in bilateral relations was confirmed by its drilling
activities in Eastern Mediterranean, off the coast of Cyprus, which the EU finds it
illegal but avoids a confrontation with Turkey warning that Turkey could be
sanctioned for ‘undermining the sovereignty of Cyprus’.71 This was immediately
countered by a Turkish threat of deferring the migration deal and announcing the
suspension of the readmission agreement with the EU,72 and in a matter of no time,
the EU decided to postpone the sanctions in order to ‘de-escalate’ tensions.73 In this
context, the steady increase in illegal arrivals to the Greek islands in the summer of
2019,74 though not comparable to the pre-deal numbers, can be interpreted as a
warning to the EU from the Turkish government signalling its willingness to use the
migration card. It appears that Turkey as the much needed ‘gatekeeper’ for migrants
destined to Europe has got a new-found leverage over the EU.75
4.6 GATEKEEPER TURKEY: DOMESTIC COSTS
The strategic gain as a gatekeeper of Europe attained by the migration deal with the
EU has turned into a political liability in the face of growing anti-migration
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sentiment in Turkey. The presence and maintenance of about four million Syrian
refugees have increasingly proven to be a source of widespread discontent amidst
growing unemployment, deepening economic crisis, and changing the demographic
structure in almost all major cities of Turkey.76 Blaming the government for its
Syrian policy as the root of the problem and disapproving the public resources spent
on the refugees exceeding 40 billion USD, as the government often declared to
complain that international community did not share Turkey’s burden, people at
large have grown disconcerted. In fact, discontent about the way in which the
government has managed the Syrian crisis stands as the single issue of concern that
unites the Turkish public who are otherwise deeply polarized.77 Indeed, opinion
polls suggest that more than 80% of Turkish nationals want Syrian refugees to be
repatriated to their country.78
The government, from the very beginning, used an Islamic terminology to rally
support to its open-door policy to the Syrian refugees likening them to the early
Muslims of Mecca who sought refuge in Madina at the outset of Islam, and the
Turkish people hosting them as ensar, the helpers. Likewise, the Syrian refugees have
been described as part of Islamic Ummah, thus the religious brothers of Muslim
Turkish people. Recently, it seems that even such religious rhetoric does not help
the government to contain the anti-Syrian sentiments in Turkey. It is widely
accepted, even by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) circles that the
government’s refugee policy, including the migration deal with the EU that was
designed to keep the Syrian refugees in Turkey, played a significant role in losing the
control of the largest cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, to the main opposition
party in the 2019 local elections.79 Immediately after the elections, the ministry of
interior decided to deport the Syrian refugees without registration in Istanbul to
cities where they are registered in an attempt to diffuse anti-Syrian sentiments that
have turned into an anti-government political position.80 The recent scheme of the
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government, though with almost no possibility of realization, to set up a ‘safe zone’
in the north of Syria where president Erdogan declared to resettle three million
Syrian refugees from Turkey81 is another move to address the political cost of the
Syrian refugees demonstrating that the gatekeeper policy of the government has
backfired at the home front.
5 CONCLUSION
A deal that would halt the irregular mass migration towards Europe in 2016
seemed to be of utmost importance for the EU as the flow of migrants had put
significant pressure on the Union, surfaced divergences of opinion within and
between the Member States on how to respond to it while also contributing
tremendously to the rise of Euroscepticism. The Turkish side, on the other
hand, was anxious to redefine its relations with the EU on a new ground that
would emphasize its equality and indispensability to the EU as a strategic partner if
not a full-fledged member. Both sides, thus, appeared better off signing a migration
agreement which they did on 18 March 2016. Despite occasional bickering,
neither the Turkish government nor the EU has so far described the refugee
agreement as an outright failure. While the Turkish side has stated its dissatisfaction
especially about its financial benefits and lack of progress on visa liberalization as
promised and sometimes has threatened to withdraw from the deal the European
side has continuously declared the deal an overall success that must be kept.82
From a European perspective, looking purely to the number of irregular
migrants crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey before and after the deal it can
be concluded that the EU–Turkey migration deal has, at least partially, accom-
plished its objectives. However, a more nuanced analysis yields that the deal has its
defective outcomes, and, thus, not been a complete success for both sides that
undermines its sustainability.
For Turkey, a country negotiating accession, the deal not only provided
financial support, but it also helped gain significant leverage over the EU. It helped
the authoritarian government in Ankara that had increasingly been isolated in the
world gain status and strength internationally. The deal also manifested that the
relations with Turkey were no longer located in the context of a candidate country
with a faraway prospect of membership but by a strategic partnership on issues of
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yon-suriyeli-m%C3%BClteciyi-bar%C4%B1nd%C4%B1rabilir (accessed 19 Jan. 2020); S. Adar,
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82 Avramopoulos: EU/Turkey Migrants Deal Must Survive, Euronews (12 Sept.2019), https://www.euronews.
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common concern like migration. The Turkish government has viewed the deal as
a power instrument despite the fact that it has often asked for more, a rhetorical
push to test the currency of its newly acquired power.
Yet, using the deal as leverage has not secured visa liberalization and opening
of new chapters in accession negotiations, an objective stated in the agreement.
Moreover, by settling for a strategic relationship with the EU the Turkish govern-
ment has effectively shelved off its long-fought objective of full membership.
While the deal aimed to deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey
it has, in fact, had the opposite effect. The tendency of the Turkish government to
use the deal as a bargaining chip against the EU resulted in resentment and
uneasiness in the European circles. Disputes between the two sides completely
unrelated to illegal migration, such as the drilling in East Mediterranean, pose to
jeopardize the sustainability of the 2016 agreement which has been finally
acknowledged by a key architect of the deal, Germany’s Chancellor Angela
Merkel.83 Thus, the migration deal has further politicized the EU-Turkish rela-
tions, creating an impression in Europe that the EU has been taken hostage by an
untrustworthy Turkey that often threatens to open its borders and flood Europe
with migrants.
On the other hand, the EU’s reputation as a normative power has been
scrutinized as it appeared prioritizing security over human rights as reflected in
the migration deal. A Union that has been pursuing a policy of protecting and
promoting human rights worldwide has been subject to excessive criticisms that it
has been committing severe human rights violations and infringement of the
internationally recognized right for asylum. Also, accepting Turkey with a dubious
human rights record documented by the EU itself over the years as a safe third
country for the sake of migration deal has damaged the EU’s claim to be a
normative power.
The deal has also instigated significant political costs for the Turkish govern-
ment. The public in Turkey has increasingly come to believe that with the deal the
Turkish government has accepted to keep Syrian refugees in Turkey for good,
relieving Europe at the expense of Turkey. The displeasure of the Turkish citizens
with the presence of the nearly four million Syrian refugees trapped in Turkey due
to the migration deal was reflected in the 2019 local elections in which the ruling
AKP lost two major cities, Istanbul and Ankara. It is most likely that Erdogan will
not risk his political future for the sake of the deal, and may find ways to stem off
the pressure of Turkey’s refugee crisis by keeping his option of opening the gates
for migrants to Europe on the table.
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Hence, when thirty-six Turkish soldiers were killed in Idlib by Russian
backed Syrian government forces on 27 February 2020 the Turkish government
decided to play its ‘refugee card’ by opening its borders for refugees to depart for
the EU countries. The decision of the Turkish government was geared to distract
its public opinion away from such a heavy loss, put pressure on the EU to extract
more financial assistance for hosting Syrian refugees, and force the EU to support
its plan to set up a safe zone in north-western Syria where refugees resident in
Turkey were planned to be resettled. Declaration to provide free passage into the
EU territory via Greece has been the first, but long-waited, blow to the deal. Tens
of thousands of migrants gathered at the border with the facilitating hands of the
Turkish authorities encountered tough Greek stand effectively shutting down the
border. The EU strongly denounced Turkey’s use of ‘migratory pressure for
political purposes’, yet agreed to set up working groups to ‘review’ implementation
of the March 2016 deal84 while the German chancellor accused Turkey of trying
to ‘solve its problems on the backs of refugees’.85
As the February-March 2020 crisis once more displayed, the prospect for
maintaining the EU–Turkey migration deal seems dim. Yet, the longevity of the
deal can still be extended by strengthening it with some improvements that will
address Turkey’s imminent refugee problem and the root cause of the Syrian
refugee flow. The upcoming German presidency of the European Council may
be a facilitating factor for a prospect of updating the deal since Germany as a
country that hosts the greatest number of migrants from Syria in Europe is also the
architect of the deal. However, Turkey’s democratic backsliding in recent years
continues to constitute an obstacle to improve political cooperation and foster trust
between the two sides increasing the frailty of the deal.
In any possible initiative to reinforce the deal, the EU should recognize the
fact that it is neighbouring the world’s largest refugee-hosting country, and as such
without reducing Turkey’s burden the March 2016 deal is unlikely to relieve the
EU of new migration waves using the Turkey route. A plausible policy for the EU
would be to help Turkey increase its border management capabilities as, in
addition to the Syrian refugees, an increasing number of migrants from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq use the Turkish route into the EU, evident
in the recent refugee crisis on the Turkish-Greek border in February/March
84 European Council, Statement of the Foreign Affairs Council, Press Release (6 Mar. 2020), https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/03/06/statement-of-the-foreign-affairs-council-
on-syria-and-turkey/ (accessed 12 Mar. 2020).
85 Germany’s Merkel: Turkey’s Handling of Migrant and Refugee Crisis ‘Unacceptable’, DW (9 Mar. 2020),
https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-merkel-turkeys-handling-of-migrant-and-refugee-crisis-unaccep
table/a-52688912 (accessed 12 Mar. 2020).
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2020.86 The prospect of the EU–Turkey deal also depends on the degree to which
the Syrian refugees have been settled in Turkey economically and socially inte-
grating with the host country. To facilitate this process, the EU needs to work
together with the Turkish government notwithstanding the nature of the regime
in Ankara, engage with civil society, and continue to provide financial stimulants.
However, it must not be forgotten that the root cause of the Syrian refugee
crisis is the civil war in Syria. The EU cannot remain indifferent to the situation in
Syria while being concerned about the flow of Syrian refugees into Europe. To
prevent new outflows and encourage the ones in Turkey to return to their
homeland requires to make Syria safe. To do so an active EU engagement to
stop the war and a commitment to the reconstruction of Syria is needed.
In short, without addressing the question of Turkey’s capability to control its
borders, facilitating the integration of Syrian refugees economically and socially
into Turkey, and putting an effort to peacefully resolve the civil war in Syria the
EU–Turkey deal is bound to remain fragile.
86 G. Abdul-Ahad, ‘Just Run’: On the Turkey-Greece Border as Refugees Try to Break Through, The Guardian
(2 Mar. 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/just-run-on-the-turkey-greece-
border-as-refugees-try-to-break-through (accessed 12 Mar. 2020).
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